

Math 261C: Randomized Algorithms

Lecture topic: $\#SAT \in IP$

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Theorem 1. $\#SAT \in IP$

To prove the theorem, we start by encoding a CNF, ϕ with a polynomial, $\phi^*(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ over \mathbb{N} . The number 1 encodes \top , the number 0 encodes \perp . The formula ϕ^* is defined inductively. For the base cases, $x_i^* = x_i$, and $\bar{x}_i^* = 1 - x_i$. Inductively, we have $(a \wedge b \wedge c)^* = a^* \cdot b^* \cdot c^*$, and $(a \vee b \vee c)^* = 1 - (1 - a^*) \cdot (1 - b^*) \cdot (1 - c^*)$. It suffices to consider 3-SAT, but it is easy to generalize these notions. Observe that $\deg(\phi) \leq |\phi|$.

Next, notice that

$$\#SAT(\phi) = \sum_{a_1, \dots, a_n \in \{0,1\}} \phi(a_1, \dots, a_n) =: S.$$

Observe that $S \leq 2^n$, so it suffices to verify the value of $S \pmod p$ for $p > 2^n$. The prover will supply $p > 2^n$ along with a Pratt certificate for p . We think of S as being part of the input. If we are being careful, we remark that the thing we are actually proving is that the graph of $\#SAT$ is in IP. However, it is not a big deal either way, because the (all powerful) prover could simply pass along the value of S , but it is customary to define IP as a decision procedure, and not a function class.

Definition 2.

$$f_i(x_1, \dots, x_i) := \sum_{a_{i+1} \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{a_n \in \{0,1\}} \phi^*(x_1, \dots, x_i, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_n)$$

In the following protocol, we will fix values a_1, \dots, a_{i-1} , and then define

$$g_i(x_i) := f_i(a_1, \dots, a_{i-1}, x_i)$$

a univariate polynomial of degree less than or equal to $|\phi|$. The polynomial g_i is specified indirectly as a polynomial size. Let $h_i(x_i)$ be an explicit representation of g_i , in other words, its coefficients are given explicitly.

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1.1. **Protocol.** The *IP* protocol for $\#SAT$ is as follows:

Input: ϕ, S .

Output:

Accept if $\#SAT(\phi) = S$ (with probability 1 for the honest prover).

Reject if $\#SAT(\phi) \neq S$ (with probability close to 1 for all provers).

Round 1: Prover supplies $p > 2^n$ and a Pratt certificate for p , and an explicit description of $h_1(x_1)$.

Verifier rejects if Pratt certificate is invalid, or if $S \neq h_1(0) + h_1(1)$.

Subsequent rounds check that $h_1(x)$ is correct.

Round i : The verifier picks $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random and sends a_i to the prover. Notice that this is an *IP* protocol, so in principle we could use private coins, but that we only need public coins.

Prover sends $h_{i+1}(a_{i+1})$ to verifier (as an explicitly specified polynomial.)

Verifier checks that $h_i(a_i) = h_{i+1}(0) + h_{i+1}(1)$, and rejects if not.

At round $n + 1$: Verifier checks that h_{n+1} is the constant polynomial.

$$\phi^*(a_1, \dots, a_n).$$

V accepts if so, and rejects if not.

1.2. **Analysis.** If $S = \#SAT(\phi)$ then the honest prover causes the verifier to accept with probability 1.

Now suppose $S \neq \#SAT(\phi)$. Fix a prover P , possibly malicious.

Claim I: $\text{Prob}[V \text{ accepts}] \leq \frac{|\phi|}{p} \cdot n \leq \frac{|\phi|n}{2^n} = O(1)$

Claim II: $\text{Prob}[V \text{ accepts} | h_i(x_i) \text{ is incorrect}] \leq \frac{|\phi|}{2^n} \cdot (n - i + 1)$.

Recall that $|\phi|$ bounds the degrees of the h_i 's. Observe that Claim II implies Claim I.

Proof of Claim II. Induct on $i = n + 1, \dots, 1$. For the base case, $i = n + 1$, we have $\text{Prob}[V \text{ accepts}] = 0$.

For the induction step, $\text{Prob}[V \text{ accepts} | h_i \text{ is incorrect}]$ is less than or equal to

$$\text{Prob}[V \text{ accepts} | h_i \text{ is incorrect and } h_{i+1} \text{ is correct}] + \text{Prob}[V \text{ accepts} | h_{i+1} \text{ is incorrect}].$$

This is less than or equal to

$$\frac{|\phi|}{p} + \frac{|\phi|}{p}(n - (i + 1) - 1) \leq \frac{|\phi|}{p}(n - i + 1)$$

by the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma and the induction hypothesis, respectively. \square

REFERENCES

- [1] C. Lund and L. Fortnow, H. Karloff, and N. Nisan. *Algebraic methods for interactive proof systems*. Journal of the ACM, volume 39, issue 4 (1992): 859–868.
- [2] Adi Shamir. *IP = PSPACE*. Journal of the ACM, volume 39, issue 4 (1992): 869–877.