

Logical Validity & Logical Implication

Def'n \mathcal{M} is a model of a sentence A , or \mathcal{M} satisfies A , if $\mathcal{M} \models A$.

\mathcal{M} is a model of a set Γ of sentences, or \mathcal{M} satisfies Γ , if $\mathcal{M} \models B$ for all $B \in \Gamma$.

Def'n $\models A$, A is logically valid, if for all structures \mathcal{M} , $\mathcal{M} \models A$.

$\Gamma \models A$, Γ logically implies A , if for all structures, if $\mathcal{M} \models \Gamma$ then $\mathcal{M} \models A$.

Here Γ, A are still (sets of) sentences (not formulas)

Example $\models \forall x \forall y E(x, y) \rightarrow \forall y \forall x E(x, y)$

$\forall x (x \cdot x = x) \models \forall x ((x - x) \cdot (x \cdot x) = x)$

Now A is a formula & T is a set of formulas.

Defn: The pair (α, σ) satisfies A if $\alpha \models A[\sigma]$.

The pair (α, σ) satisfies T if $\alpha \models B[\sigma]$ for all $B \in T$.

We can also say " A is satisfiable" or " T is satisfiable".

Defn A is logically valid, $\models A$, if for all same pairs (α, σ) ,
 $\alpha \models A[\sigma]$.

T logically implies A , written $T \models A$, if for all pairs (α, σ) ,
if $\alpha \models B[\sigma]$ for all $B \in T$, then $\alpha \models A[\sigma]$.

Examples $\models \forall x (P(x) \rightarrow P(x))$.

\rightarrow $\models P(x) \rightarrow P(x)$ \Leftarrow

$P(x) \models P(x)$

$P(x), P(x) \rightarrow Q(x) \models Q(x)$

$P(x) \not\models P(y)$

$P(x) \not\models \forall x P(x)$

Example of
tautological implication.

Example $| \alpha | = \{0, 1\}$ $P^{\alpha} = \{0\}$.
 $\sigma(x) = 0$ $\sigma(y) = 1$

Definition $A \models B$, A is logically equivalent to B , if $A \models B$ and $B \models A$.

Example of a logical implication:

$$\forall x P(x) \models P(y)$$

$$P(x) \models \exists y P(y)$$

$$\exists y \forall x P(x,y) \models \forall x \exists y P(x,y)$$

Universe is always non-empty

Given any Ω , any σ .

Suppose $\Omega \models \forall x P(x)[\sigma]$

i.e. for ^{any} x -variant τ of σ , $\Omega \models P(x)[\tau]$

Let τ be in particular, the x -variant of σ with ~~$\tau(x) = \sigma(x)$~~ . $\tau(x) = \sigma(y)$

$$\sigma(y) \in |a|$$

y is a variable x_j .

Since $\Omega \models P(x)[\tau]$, $\tau(x) \in P^\Omega$

Thus $\sigma(y) \in P^\Omega$ since $\tau(x) = \sigma(y)$.

So $\Omega \models P(y)[\sigma]$.

$$\forall x \exists y P(x,y) \not\models \exists y \forall x P(x,y)$$

$|a| = \{a, 1\}$
 $P^\Omega = \{ \langle 0, 0 \rangle, \langle 1, 1 \rangle \}$

$$\models x = x$$

$$\models \exists x (x = x)$$

Theorem: [Semantic Principle of Contradiction]

(a) $\models A$ if and only if $\{\neg A\}$ is unsatisfiable.

(b) $\Gamma \models A$ if and only if $\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\}$ is unsatisfiable.

Pf (a) is just (b) with $\Gamma = \emptyset$.

(b), $\Gamma \models A$ iff $\forall \mathcal{M}, \sigma$, if $\mathcal{M} \models B[\sigma]$ for all $B \in \Gamma$, then $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma]$.
 $\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\}$ is unsatisfiable iff $\forall (\mathcal{M}, \sigma)$, it is not the case that
 $\mathcal{M} \models B[\sigma]$ for all $B \in \Gamma$ and $\mathcal{M} \models \neg A[\sigma]$.

These are equivalent. □

Theorem [Semantic Deduction Theorem]

(a) $\models A \rightarrow B$ if and only if $A \models B$

(b) $\Gamma \models A \rightarrow B$ if and only if $\Gamma, A \models B$.

Pf (a) is a special case of (b), $\Gamma = \emptyset$.

(b) has an easy proof similar to the above proof □

Tautologies (in first-order logic)

Let A be a first-order formula.

Defn A is a tautology if there is a propositional tautology B with variables p_1, \dots, p_k and there are first-order formulas C_1, \dots, C_k so that $B(C_1, C_2, \dots, C_k / p_1, \dots, p_k)$ is the same formula as A .

Example $\underbrace{P}_1(x) \rightarrow \underbrace{Q}_2(x) \rightarrow \underbrace{P}_1(x)$ is a tautology.

Take B to be $p_1 \rightarrow p_2 \rightarrow p_1$

C_1 to be $P(x)$

C_2 to be $Q(x)$

Theorem If A is a tautology (A is a first-order formula), then $\models A$, A is logically valid.

Proof: Fix α, σ . Need to show $\alpha \models A[\sigma]$.
Let φ be the truth assignment s.t. $\varphi(p_i) = \begin{cases} T & \text{if } \alpha \models C_i[\sigma] \\ F & \text{if } \alpha \not\models C_i[\sigma] \end{cases}$

Claim $\varphi(B) = T$ iff $\alpha \models A[\sigma]$

$\varphi(D) = T$ iff $\alpha \models D(C_1, \dots, C_k / p_1, \dots, p_k)[\sigma]$ for all subformula D of B .

Examples

$P(x) \wedge Q(x) \rightarrow Q(x) \wedge P(x)$ is a tautology

$$P_1 \wedge P_2 \rightarrow P_2 \wedge P_1$$

$P(x) \wedge Q(x) \rightarrow Q(x) \vee P(x)$ is a tautology

$$P_1 \wedge P_2 \rightarrow P_2 \vee P_1$$

$\forall x (P(x) \rightarrow P(x))$ is not a tautology

P_1

$x=y \rightarrow y=x$ is not a tautology.

$$P_1 \rightarrow P_2$$

$\exists x P(x) \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$ is not a tautology

$$P_1 \rightarrow P_2$$

Defin T tautologically implies A if there are $B_1, \dots, B_\ell \in T$

st. $B_1 \rightarrow B_2 \Rightarrow \dots \rightarrow B_\ell \rightarrow A$ is a tautology.

equivalently $B_1 \wedge B_2 \wedge \dots \wedge B_\ell \rightarrow A$ is a tautology.

Example

$P(x) \wedge Q(x)$ tautologically implies $Q(x) \vee P(x)$.

$\exists x P(x) \rightarrow \exists x P(x)$ is a tautology.

$$P_1 \rightarrow P_1$$

$\exists x P(x)$ is called an alphabetic variant of $\exists y P(y)$

Theorem: Let A be a formula.

Let B be a subformula of A .

Let $C \equiv B$ (C is logically equivalent to B).

Let A^* be obtained from A by replacing B with C .

Then $A \equiv A^*$ (i.e. A is logically equivalent to A^*).

Defn A is ~~tautologically~~ ^{logically} equivalent to B , $A \equiv B$, if
 $A \equiv B$ and $B \equiv A$. (A, B are first-order formulas)

Example: $\forall x A \equiv \forall x \neg \neg A$ since $A \equiv \neg \neg A$

the latter holds since A is tautologically equivalent to A .

$$\forall x \exists y (P(x) \rightarrow Q(y)) \equiv \forall x \exists y (\neg Q(y) \rightarrow \neg P(x))$$