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The Logic of purely epistemic obligation

Let L be a classical language enriched with 'xB' a modal operator for 'x believes that p is true', 'xE' a modal operator for 'x has adequate evidence that p is true', and ($E0$ read 'on epistemic grounds it is obligatory that') $E0p$ wf when p is 'Aq', q wf and A a doxastic modality of degree > 0.
Axiom 1. $EPxBp \equiv \sim E0 \sim xBp$
Axiom 2. $E0xBp \supset EPxBp$
Axiom 3. $E0xBp \supset E0 \sim xB \sim p$
Axiom 4. $E0 \sim xBp \supset xE \sim p$
Axiom 5. $xEp \supset E0xBp$
From A1-A5, we get T1 and T2:

T1. $EPxBp \equiv \sim xE \sim p$
T2. $E0xBp \equiv xEp$

Recent work in epistemology includes the thesis: the analysis of knowledge in terms of true belief plus adequate evidence is inferior to an analysis in terms of true belief plus (epistemically) *justified belief* ('$xJBp$' hereafter). Some authors (e.g., Alston, Feldman, Plantinga) appear to use 'justified belief' so as to validate D1: $xJBp \equiv EpxBp$. Given D1, T1 shows that the justified belief analysis gives: $sKp \equiv (p \cdot xBp \cdot \sim xE \sim p)$, an absurdity. If we replace D1 by the stronger D2: $xJBp \equiv EOxBp$, T2 shows that the justified belief analysis gives us the traditional theory it was to replace: $xKp \equiv (p \cdot xBp \cdot xEp)$. Aside from its use in showing flaws in some recent epistemology, this logic of purely epistemic obligation is of interest as a theory of the sort of that might have been endorsed by W. K. Clifford.